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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
eight voting members, two nonvoting members, and two nonvoting invitees. The BUCC Conun.i.ttee's position was opposed by
A committee in a chapter 11 both of the nonvoting members,
case often includes so-called ex First National Bank of Chicago
officio nonvoting members. The (FNBC) and the Federal Deposit
question arises whether the non- Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
voting members may be privy to The voting members asserted that
all privileged discussions between nonvoting members were not necthe committee's counsel and the essary to the workings of the
voting members. This problem committee because their nonvotarose in the Baldwin-United case 1 ing status deprived them of a
on a motion by the Baldwin- m~or incident of committee
United Official Unsecured Credi- membership, and tbeir presence
tors' Committee (BUCC) to during meetings witt) the commitamend the order appointing the tee's counsel might be deemed a
committee to eliminate the ex waiver of the committee's attorofficio nonvoting ijlembers from ney/clientprivilege. Moreover, the
the committee and to reclassify FDIC could not serve as a committee member under any circumthem as invitees.
stances because it was not a "person" as defined in Section 101 of
Waiver of Privilege?
the Bankruptcy Code and thereAs originally constituted, the fore, not eligible for appointment as
BUCC Committee consisted of a member of the committee under
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin & Section 1102(b)(1).
CREDITORS' COMMITTEE
COMPOSITION-AVOIDING
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
CONFLICT

Weintraub & Crames, New Yolk City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
*"' Bel\iamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, f!ofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to the law firm of
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Kadin &
Peddy, Garden City, New York; member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1 In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 Bankr.
802 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (Newsome, J .).

Should Attorney-Client Privilege
Be Ignored?
FNBC countered, arguing that
the attorney/client privilege was
not available to a creditors' committee and even if it were,
FNBC's presence did not endanger the privilege. The FDIC
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joined in the bank's argument and
2. Communication must be made
to a member of the bar acting as
asserted that nothing in Section
lawyer in connection with the
1102(b)(l) prevented it from servcommunication or to the lawing as a nonvoting member on the
yer's subordinate;
coll)lllittee. Moreover, counsel for
3. The communication relates to a
another official committee, the
fact of which the attorney was
D.H. Baldwin Official Unsecured
informed by the client, without
Creditors Committee (DHBCC)
the presence of strangers, for
filed an amicus brief requesting
the purposes flf securing primatthe court to ignore the privilege
ily either an opiniop on the law,
is:;ue and hold that all members of
legal services, or assistance in
the committee are entitled to the
soqte legal proceeding but not
for the purpose of committing a
same rights, regardless of whether
crime or tort; and
or not they vote.
4. The privilege has been claimed
The position of DHBCC apand not waived by the client, i
pealed to the court because the
''concerns for protecting allegedly
Narrow Construction of the
privileged communication is more
Privilege
imaginary than real, since no concrete dispute regarding disclosure
The court observed that the
of information has been present- privilege was to be narrow:J.y ~on
ed. A determination of whether strued "since it stands as an exthe privilege attaches to a particu- ception to the policy favoring fuU
lar communication is primarily a disclosure and discovery of all
question of fact, which cannot be facts in the pursuit of truth." 4
decided in the abstract. " 2
Although one may have considerable concern in undertaking an
Parameters of the Privilege
analysis of the privilege, under the
Additionally, the court indi- circumstances presented, the nacated that the attorney-client priv- ture of the dispute .made an analyilege did not attach to all com- sis unavoidable. However, the
munications between the tw9 first question to be determined
parties but only to those commu- was whether communications benications tpat fell within well- tween counsel and a creditors'
established parameters. The privi- committee, which met all the
above criteria, were protected
lege applied .only if:
from disclosure by the attorney/
1. The holder of the privilege is or

sought to become a client;

2

38 Bankr. at 804.

3 Criteria
summarized from United
States v. ~nited Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358-359 (D. Mass. 1950).
4
38 Bankr. at 804.
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client privilege. ·Counsel for the
objectors argued that the privilege
was inimical to the very purposes
of a creditors' committee, which
was established not merely to represent creditors in the negotiation
of a plan, but to provide them with
ready access to information regarding a debtor's affairs.
Relationship of Privilege Jo
Fiduciary Responsibilities of
Committee

The court's response to the objections took cognizance of the
fiduciary responsibilities that a
creditors' committee owed to
those it represents, but the court
was unconvinced that the attorney/client privilege was inherently
antagonistic to those responsibilities.
The purposes underlying the privilege have no less applicability to a
creditor's committee than they do
to any other entity, at least when
disclosure or privileged communications is sought by those who are
not represented by the committee,
or who stand-in an adversarial relationship with it. If the committee
cannot engage in 'full and frank
communications' with its attorneys
without fear of disclosure to such
outsiders, then its work may be
seriously hampered, to the detriment of those it represents. 5

s Id. at 804-805.

[VOL. 20 : 288 1988]

Balancing of Privilege

However, the court noted that
although the privilege may be absolute as to those who are not represented by the creditors' committee, a narrower construction
was needed as to those represented: "A fiduciary owes the
obligation to his beneficiaries to
go about his duties without
obscuring his reasons from the
legitimate inquiries of the beneficiaries. " 6 This relationship required a."balancing" of the injury
resulting from disclosure with the
interest of those whom the committee represented in obtaining information. Analogies that the
court drew were the relationship
between a corporation and its
shareholders and of controlling
shareholders to minority shareholders.
Analogy to Shareholder
Derivative Suits

Analyzing cases in which
shareholders have sought disclosure of privileged information
from a corporation in shareholder
derivative suits, the bankruptcy
court, citing the Garner case, 7
stateo that "many courts have
held that the privilege is available
6 Id. at 805 (quoting from Valente v.
Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 370 (D. Del.
1975)).
7 Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093, 1103-1104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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to the corporation subject to the
righ( of the stockholders to show
cause why it should not be invoked in the partis;ular instance.
. . . This same rule has been
applied in cases involving other
type~ of fiduciary relationships.
. . . (defendant bank acting as
fiduciary for plaintiff in a land
purchase) . . . (rule applied to
pension fund trustees) .... " 8
Burden of Nondisclosure
Is on Committee

The court thought that the doctrine in the Garner case struck an
appropriate balance between the
creditor's right to information and
the committee's need for confidentiality, ''and accordingly, we
find it applicable to requests by
creditors for privileged information from the committee that represents them." 9 However, the
court concluded that the committee should bear the burden of establishing good cause for not disclosing privileged information to
its constituent creditors. Nonetheless, the court indicated that there
might be sound policy reasons for
nondisclosure that did not involve
the attorney/client relationship
and that such situations should be
dealt with on a case-by-case basis
in order to adequately protect the
interests of both fiduciaries and
beneficiaries.

Control Group Test Rejected

Having found that the BUCC
Official Committee was entitled
to the protection afforded the attorney/client privilege, the court
found that nonvoting members
"are no less 'necessary' to the
workings of the committee than
are voting members, and accordingly that their presence in no way
threatens the privileged nature of
communications with counsel." 10
The court rejected the argument
of the BUCC Official Committee's
counsel seeking to apply the
"control group" test, which was
specifically rejected in Upjohn. 11
That test provided that only voting members control the committee's decision-making process.
The court pointed out that FNBC
was an indenture trustee for some
$180 million in debentures issued
by the debtor and that FNBC desired the status of a nonvoting
member in order to avoid a
conflict of interest between its
fiduciary duties to the debenture
holders and its fiduciary duties as
a committee member. Considering the substantial interests of
FNBC, "it can hardly be asserted
that their nonvoting status makes
their input a~ a committee member
unnecessarydo the committee's
counsel in rendering legal advice,
or that it should be considered a
'stranger' to the committee. Cer111 ld.

s 38 Bankr. at 805.
9 Id.

11

at 806.
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S.

383, 397 (1981).
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tainly Upjohn requires a contrary
result." 12

move the FNBC and reclassify it
as an invitee.

Governmental Units Jneligible for
Committee Membership

Observation

As to the eligibility of the
FDIC's membership, the court
focused on Section 11 02(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code: " 'A committee of creditors appointed under
subsection (a) of this section shall
ordinarily consist of the persons
willing to serve, that hold the
seven largest claims against the
debtor .... ' A 'person' as defined
in Section 101(30) 'includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.' " 13 Nor was the
court impressed with the FDIC's
argument that it only precludes a
governmental unit acting as a voting member of a committee. Accordingly, the motion of the
BUCC Official Creditors' Committee to amend the court's order
appointing the committee was
granted to the extent of removing
the FDIC from the committee and
reclassifying it as an invitee and
denied insofar as it sought to re-

12

38 Bankr. at 806.
/d. (emphasis added). At the time of
this decision, "person" was defined in
§ 101(30). Pursuant to subsequent amendments, the definition of "person" is now
contained in § 101(35).
13

The case clarifies the two capacities in which creditors may
become members of the committee as well as attain the status of
invitees. Voting on committee
resolutions is performed only by
fullfledged members. However,
nonvoting or ex officio members
are entitled to participate in all
discussions and resolutions. Confidential information between the
committee's attorney and the committee can be revealed to the
nonvoting members without the
privilege bein~ waived. Invitees
have none of the rights that are
accorded to nonvoting members
and in essence are merely auditors.
Any creditor who requests confidential information from the committee puts the burden on the
committee to establish good cause
as to why the information should
not be given. Each situation will
be disposed of on a case-by-case
basis. Moreover, in such situations, the statement made to a
creditor in confidence as authorized by the court should be
protected by the attorney/client
privilege to the same extent as if it
had been made to a member of the
committee.
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